Strength of social tie predicts cooperative investment in a human social network by Harrison, Freya et al.
        
Citation for published version:
Harrison, F, Sciberras, J & James, R 2011, 'Strength of social tie predicts cooperative investment in a human
social network', PLoS ONE, vol. 6, no. 3, e18338. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0018338
DOI:
10.1371/journal.pone.0018338
Publication date:
2011
Link to publication
Publisher Rights
CC BY
Copyright:  2011 Harrison et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are
credited.
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
Strength of Social Tie Predicts Cooperative Investment in
a Human Social Network
Freya Harrison1,2*, James Sciberras1, Richard James3
1Department of Zoology, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2Department of Biology and Biochemistry, University of Bath, Bath, United Kingdom,
3Department of Physics, University of Bath, Bath, United Kingdom
Abstract
Social networks – diagrams which reflect the social structure of animal groups – are increasingly viewed as useful tools in
behavioural ecology and evolutionary biology. Network structure may be especially relevant to the study of cooperation,
because the action of mechanisms which affect the cost:benefit ratio of cooperating (e.g. reciprocity, punishment, image
scoring) is likely to be mediated by the relative position of actor and recipient in the network. Social proximity could thus
affect cooperation in a similar manner to biological relatedness. To test this hypothesis, we recruited members of a real-
world social group and used a questionnaire to reveal their network. Participants were asked to endure physical discomfort
in order to earn money for themselves and other group members, allowing us to explore relationships between willingness
to suffer a cost on another’s behalf and the relative social position of donor and recipient. Cost endured was positively
correlated with the strength of the social tie between donor and recipient. Further, donors suffered greater costs when a
relationship was reciprocated. Interestingly, participants regularly suffered greater discomfort for very close peers than for
themselves. Our results provide new insight into the effect of social structure on the direct benefits of cooperation.
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Introduction
To a greater or lesser extent, most animal species live in groups
for at least part of their lives and interactions between individuals
affect the expression and evolution of behavioural traits [1,2]. The
social structure of a group of animals can be represented by a
social network diagram which shows individuals as nodes
connected by edges [3,4,5]. An edge connecting two individuals
reflects the presence of some sort of social tie or interaction:
grooming events, antagonistic encounters, physical proximity and
sex are examples of interactions that may be used to construct
networks (e.g. [6,7,8,9,10,11]; see [3] for a review). Edges may
simply reflect binary data (presence or absence of a ties, e.g.
groomed or did not groom) or they may reflect continuous data
that reflects the frequency or strength of the interaction (e.g.
grooming frequency or duration). Knowing who interacts with
whom (and how) adds a new facet to understanding population
structure [12]. For example, network theory has been applied to
studies of how diseases [13,14] and behavioural memes [15,16,17]
spread and evolve and to visualise group structuring based on
kinship, [6,10] age and sex [18] and behavioural type [19].
Network structure in its turn is likely to affect the expression and
evolution of social traits and the value of applying a networks-
based approach to animal – including human – behavioural
ecology is increasingly recognised [3,5,11,20,21,22,23].
The evolution of cooperation is one question which could
benefit from consideration within the framework of social
networks. Alleles that cause their bearers to suffer some cost in
order to increase another individual’s direct fitness can be
favoured if this behaviour results in increased inclusive fitness for
the actor, due to direct (self) and/or indirect (kin-selected) fitness
benefits [24,25]. Direct benefits of cooperation arise when
cooperative individuals can expect help in the future via direct
or indirect reciprocity, when punishment or sanctions are imposed
on non-cooperators or when cooperative individuals gain mating
advantages (reviewed by [25,26,27]). The action of these
mechanisms for maintaining cooperation can be enhanced when
individuals obtain publicly-known reputations [28], for example
due to image scoring [29,30,31] or gossip [32]. The nature of
social ties between a pair of individuals in a group is likely to affect
the operation of these mechanisms: network structure will affect
the expected probability or frequency of repeated interactions and
the flow of information between individuals. Therefore, social
proximity may affect the expected benefits of cooperative
interactions in much the same way as does biological relatedness
[24,33,34,35]. Further, characteristics of individuals – such as
overall connectedness to other group members (degree), impor-
tance as a social ‘‘hub’’ linking other members (betweenness) and
position in a social hierarchy - may influence the direct benefits of
cooperating with that individual due to their ability to reciprocate,
affect an actor’s reputation, act as a conduit for generalised
reciprocity, or impose sanctions. For instance, degree or be-
tweenness of network members can vary considerably and may
show a skewed distribution [36,37,38,39], social policing may be
carried out only by a small number of individuals in the group [40]
and increased social rank may reflect increased resources for
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reciprocation, increased efficacy of reputation acquisition, in-
creased ability to police or increased probability of aggression
[41,42,43]. Additionally, it has been demonstrated in one primate
species (stumptail macaque, Macacca arctoides), that low-ranking
individuals may receive benefits from high-ranking individuals by
associating with middle-ranking individuals [44]. This is consistent
with the idea of the benefits of cooperation being passed on from
one group member to another via their social network.
Computer simulations have shown that network structure can
affect the relative fitness of cooperative genotypes [45,46,47,48,49]
and a small number of experimental studies have explicitly shown
the importance of social ties in determining whether individual
animals engage in cooperative behaviours with other group
members (e.g. predator inspection in guppies Poecilia reticulata,
[50] and food sharing in spider monkeys Ateles geoffroyi [51]). With
regard to our own species, one study [52] has explicitly explored
cooperation in arbitrarily-constructed networks of humans. The
authors showed that structuring groups of players into social
networks increased the positive effect of generalised reciprocity on
cooperation. In a similar experiment using groups of strangers,
opportunities for social contact (communication) led to lower
exploitation of a common resource pool [53]. A very small number
of studies have tested for an effect of non-artificial social closeness
on cooperation. A handful of economic studies have reported
increased giving in various types of dictator game when the social
distance between dictator and recipient is perceived to be smaller
(e.g. [54,55]). More recently, Haan et al [56] assigned high school
students into groups comprised of classmates who either were or
were not friends; they reported that contributions to a public good
were higher when groups were composed of friends. Network
thinking has also informed how we think about cooperation in
networks of firms and thus how ‘‘social structure’’ of companies
affects economic cooperation [57]. Given all this, it is surprising
that no-one has yet attempted to test explicitly for a correlation
between social distance and individual investment in cooperation
in the context of a real human social network.
As an aside, we note that, as is the general case in studies of
cooperation in humans, all of the studies listed above use a purely
economic methodology, i.e. participants are given a sum of money
for use in games. The ecological validity of this approach is not
known, and a methodology where participants perform a time-
consuming and physically demanding task in order to benefit one
another [33] seems more in keeping with a desire to understand
cooperation from the point of view of behavioural and evolu-
tionary ecology.
We therefore wished to study cooperative interactions in the
context of a revealed social network in order to address two
hypotheses. Firstly, is willingness to cooperate with another
individual correlated with the proximity of that individual in a
social network? Secondly, what is the effect of reciprocated versus
unreciprocated social relationships on cooperation? (i.e. what
happens when A trusts B but B does not trust A?) We recruited
members of a research unit and used a questionnaire to construct a
weighted and directed network diagram which revealed the
structure of the group. Members of the group then participated in
an exercise where they endured physical discomfort in order to earn
money for themselves and other group members, allowing us to look
for relationships between willingness to suffer a cost on another
person’s behalf and the relative position of donor and recipient in
the network. The effects of node-based characteristics such as
seniority in the group hierarchy, social peer perception, degree and
betweenness were also explored. We are not aware of any other
study which takes this approach to investigate cooperation in a
group of real organisms with a known network structure.
Materials and Methods
Ethics statement
Written informed consent was gained from all participants and
this study was approved by the University of Oxford’s Inter-
divisional Research Ethics Committee for social science and
humanities (ref. no. SSD/CUREC1/10 – 275).
Recruitment of participants
We recruited 19 members (11 female) of a research unit at the
University of Oxford; all participants were at least acquainted with
one another. Participants were recruited by asking the head of the
group to forward an invitation email to all of the group members;
this was followed up by asking group members in person if they
would be interested in participating. All group members who
agreed to take part were recruited to the study. Participants
included PhD students, post-doctoral researchers, fellows and
administration staff. None of the participants were biological
relatives and all except two had previously heard of game theory/
the prisoner’s dilemma.
Building the network
Participants completed an online questionnaire about their
relationships with and perceptions of each other. The question-
naire was designed and implemented using NetworkGenie [58]
(https://secure.networkgenie.com). The full questionnaire consist-
ed of four demographic questions (sex, familiarity with game
theory, career stage and perceived relative position in the group
seniority hierarchy) and fourteen network questions. Network
questions provide response data in the form of matrices,
containing either binary (yes/no, 1/0) or ordinal data (e.g.
reflecting level of friendship or trust, frequency of interaction
etc). The questionnaire and its reduction to a master matrix is
detailed in Text S1. Briefly, questions which gave little information
were discarded, some matrices which gave comparable informa-
tion were combined and remaining matrices that were not strongly
intercorrelated were summed to provide a master matrix. De
Lange et al. [59] provide a detailed, worked example of how to
develop a network questionnaire, though it should be noted that
the exact type of questions asked and their informativeness is likely
to depend on the nature of the group being considered. UCINET
6 [60] was used for all network analysis and construction and
NetDraw [61] was used for network visualisation. The master
matrix reflected level of friendship, level of perceived mutual trust,
previous collaborative work and existence of strong positive or
negative past interactions. Link weights were scaled such that they
ranged from 0 to 1. We also calculated the betweenness of each
node: the betweenness of the ith node is defined as the number
of shortest paths between pairs of nodes other than i that pass
through i (Freeman’s standard measure of betweenness: [62]).
Physical task
For each participant, we identified four recipients in the
network. These were chosen to provide strong and weak in- and
out-links in a cross-factored design. For each participant, we
selected two of their strongest and two of their weakest out-links;
one link in each pair had a corresponding in-link that differed from
the out-link by less that 0.1 and the other had a corresponding in-
link that differed from the out-link by $0.2. Full details of links
between chosen pairs of participants are given in Text S1. We
determined each participant’s willingness to invest effort on behalf
of their recipients using a physical task. 17 participants (8 female)
were able to perform the physical task. Following the methodology
of Madsen et al., [33], participants were asked to squat against the
Cooperation in a Human Social Network
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wall with their knees forming a 90u angle; this is a cross-country ski
training exercise that quickly becomes painful. Participants were
asked to squat for themselves and for their four recipients, with the
five ‘rounds’ of effort in a randomised order. For every second
spent squatting, participants earned £0.01 for the current
recipient. There was no minimum or maximum time limit. The
identity of recipients was provided on numbered cards, which
participants turned over immediately before each ‘round.’
Participants were not told which of their peers would be squatting
for them, were instructed not to discuss the experiment with one
another and were informed that the task was not necessarily
reciprocated; i.e. their recipients would not necessarily have the
chance to earn money on their behalf. Participants began the
squatting exercise simultaneously. The task was carried out in
three-sided cubicles to prevent visual contact between participants
and classical music was played during the task to prevent
participants hearing one another’s movements: these conditions
were imposed to prevent individuals gaining information on each
other’s effort or attempting to compete with one another. Between
each squatting period, participants were allowed to stretch and
walk around to rest themselves until they felt ready to go on with
the next recipient. Because the ease of this task depends on
physical characteristics and fitness, the time spent squatting for
each non-self recipient was standardised by dividing by the time
the participant spent squatting for him or herself. A table of the
standardised squatting times is provided in Text S1. At the end of
the experiment, each participant was given a sum of money which
corresponded to the total earned on their behalf by themselves and
others. The average earning from the physical task was £6.75. The
two participants who were unable to perform the physical task
were each given a £10 shopping voucher.
Analysis of data
Response matrices were analysed in UCINET [60] as detailed
in Text S1; quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) was used to test
for correlations between matrices and build the master matrix of
in- and out-links. (See Text S1).
Network data should not be analysed using standard statistical
tests based on ordinary least squares because of the inherent non-
independence of dyadic interaction data: if one individual is an
outlier, then all of the cells in the relevant row and/or column of a
data matrix will also be outliers. Further, measures of node
characteristics such as betweenness are not independent for the
members of a network (because one agent’s betweenness depends
on that of the others). These problems and their solutions are
discussed further by other authors [63,64,65,66]. These pitfalls are
avoided if a multiple matrix regression extension of the QAP
procedure is used (MRQAP, as developed by Krackhardt [66] and
Dekker et al. [63]; see also [67]). In short, MRQAP calculates
partial matrix regression coefficients for a response matrix on
several explanatory matrices and then uses a large number of
random permutations of rows and columns within matrices to
generate a sampling distribution and assign p-values.
We regressed the matrix of standardised time squatted on the
explanatory matrices (master network matrix plus matrices of in-
minus out-link, order, sex difference, hierarchy difference and
recipient betweenness) using UCINET’s MRQAP procedure with
double Dekker semi-partialling and 10,000 permutations. Because
our response matrix had many empty cells – each participant only
squatted for four of the eighteen possible recipients – we required a
way of ensuring these missing values did not influence the outcome
of our analyses. Following the work of Cohen and Cohen [68] and
Hemelrijk [65], we replaced all missing values in the matrices of
standardised time squatted and squatting order with a value much
greater than any of the non-missing values (10) and created a
‘dummy’ matrix variable which contained zeroes in cells for which
response data was present and 10 in cells for which response data
were missing. This dummy matrix was included in the analysis,
allowing us to partial out the influence of missing data points
and obtain estimates of partial correlation coefficients for our
explanatory matrices.
Results
Figure 1 shows the social network of the group. The network
consisted of one homogeneous component with no significant
subgroup structuring, as determined by UCINET’s bi-component
algorithm: this measures whether any individuals act as ‘brokers’
between otherwise unconnected subgroups. Distributions of
participant total in- and out-degree and betweenness were not
significantly different from normal (Anderson-Darling tests,
p = 0.614, 0.430 and 0.109, respectively. Further, the centralisa-
tion index based on Freeman’s node-based measure of between-
ness, which reflects the degree to which particular individuals may
act as social ‘hubs’ was remarkably low at 0.27%. In a network
where all nodes have the same betweenness, the centralisation
index will be zero; its maximal value of 100% would result from a
star graph. (For a useful comparison, see Wasserman & Faust’s
[69] exploration of marriage networks). These results suggest that
this network shows little social substructure. Additionally, the
matrix was fairly symmetric (QAP correlation of matrix vs.
transposed matrix, r = 0.625, p,0.001; participant total in- and
out-degrees were not significantly different: Wilcoxon z = 0.16,
p = 0.872). However, some heterogeneity is evident in the peer-to-
peer relationships of the group; these range from pairs of
individuals who are connected only by virtue of belonging to this
research group to pairs of very close friends. As an example of this
heterogeneity, Figure 2 shows the links between participant 6 and
her chosen recipients.
We investigated the effects of total out- and in-link strength on
standardised effort investment by regressing the matrix of
standardised time squatted on explanatory matrices (master matrix
plus matrices of in- minus out-link, order, sex difference, hierarchy
difference and recipient betweenness) using MRQAP as described
in the Materials & Methods. Non-significant terms were dropped
from the full model in a stepwise manner to leave a minimal
model, given in Table 1. We conclude that level of cooperative
investment was positively correlated with out-link strength, in-
minus out-link strength and order (p#0.001). Thus people invested
more effort for recipients to whom they reported a close social tie,
and also for those recipients who reported a closer social tie to
them. Figure 3 shows these results, and suggests that squatting time
is higher when the in-link strength equals or exceeds the out-link
strength, suggesting that participants are able to recognise when
their peers place less value on a dyadic relationship than they do
themselves, and correspondingly invest less effort on behalf of
those peers. In other words, people invest more when social
relationships are reciprocated. Participants tended to squat longer
for recipients as the experimental session progressed (perhaps
because they got used to the exercise, or because they initially
wished to save energy for later squatting attempts). However, the
regression coefficient for order was much smaller than those for
the master matrix and of the in- minus out-link matrix (0.08 as
compared with 0.26 and 0.20, respectively). Hierarchy difference,
sex difference and recipient betweenness dropped out of the model
(p = 0.10, 0.41 and 0.21, respectively).
We also wished to explore the effects of the individual
components of the master matrix. Therefore we conducted a
Cooperation in a Human Social Network
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further MRQAP analysis, beginning with a full model that
included order, sex difference, hierarchy difference, recipient
betweenness and the four components of the master matrix:
friendship strength, perceived level of mutual trust, incidence of
past collaboration and strong past experiences. The only
significant predictors of standardised time squatted were order,
friendship strength and incidence of past collaboration. (p#0.027;
see Table 1b). All regression coefficients were small compared with
those obtained in the analysis of the master matrix.
It is notable that the standardised time squatted often exceeded
1; the tendency for participants to squat longer for very close
recipients than for themselves is evident in Figure 3. In fact, 10/17
participants recorded a standardised squatting time of .1 for at
least one recipient; one participant recorded a standardised time of
.1 for all recipients.
Discussion
We present the first (to our knowledge) explicit analysis of
relative cooperative investment in a real-world human social
network. We have used an experimental method with high
ecological validity (recruitment of a real social group and use of a
Figure 2. Links between one participant (number 6) and her
chosen recipients. Participant number is given within the node and
link weights shown numerically alongside links.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018338.g002
Figure 1. The master matrix (see Text S1) produced a directed and weighted network. Edge thickness reflects link weight (strength of
relationship) and arrows show direction. Female participants are represented by closed circles, male participants by open circles.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018338.g001
Table 1. Results of MRQAP using a) master matrix and b)
components of master matrix.
a)
independent variable regression coefficient p
intercept 0.60 -
missing values 0.85 ,0.001
master matrix 0.26 ,0.001
in- minus out-link 0.20 0.001
order 0.08 ,0.001
b)
independent variable regression coefficient p
intercept 0.63 -
missing values 0.86 ,0.001
order 0.08 ,0.001
friendship strength 0.10 ,0.001
past collaboration 0.05 0.027
See main text for explanation of MRQAP. Unstandardised regression coefficients
are shown and p-values are based on 10,000 random permutations of matrices.
R2adj = 0.998, combined p,0.001 for both models.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018338.t001
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task which incurs a recognisable physical cost) to provide new
insight into the effect of social structure on the likely direct benefits
of cooperation for different individuals in a group. We report that
social proximity increased cooperative investment in a manner
analogous to biological relatedness [24,33,34,35]. This finding is
consistent with analogous studies linking cooperation and social
closeness in two other species. One of us has previously reported
[50] that female guppies disproportionately engage in cooperative
predator inspection with others with whom they have a strong
social association in the wild, and the incidence of food sharing in
spider monkeys has been shown to be correlated with incidence of
affiliative behaviour (allogrooming; [51]). Our results are also
consistent with published data on the behaviour of friends and
non-friends in public goods games [56]. Additionally, we show that
participants invested more in peers who placed equal or greater
value on the dyadic relationship, compared with their own
assessment of the relationship.
That social proximity appears to function in an analogous
manner to biological relatedness is in some ways unsurprising.
Queller [70] has shown that the mathematics of inclusive fitness
theory and reciprocity are essentially identical – which should be
self evident, because both are founded on the existence of a
positive covariance between an actor’s expression of a cooperative
behaviour and the probability of the recipient carrying alleles that
promote the same behaviour. Therefore, if the likelihood of
individuals reciprocating cooperative acts is positively correlated
with their social proximity to the actor, we expect the exactly the
pattern of behaviour found in our experiment. Further, a reliance
on reciprocity is consistent with our conclusion that participants
invested more when the recipient reciprocated or over-reciprocated
their perceived social relationship.
It is easy to see how social proximity could increase oppor-
tunities for reciprocity, as a simple function of frequency or
duration of interactions. Further, there is some evidence that
individuals with cooperative phenotypes tend to cluster together in
networks (in network parlance, the tendency for neighbours to
share phenotypes is termed assortment or homophily). In a recent
publication, Bran˜as-Garza et al [71] note that individuals who
offer a larger share of the pie in a dictator game are more socially
integrated (as measured by betweenness and number of bidirec-
tional edges). In another dictator game played in a real social
group, Lieder et al [55] report that people who display relatively
high levels of altruism tend to have friends who also display
relatively high levels of altruism. Such assortment of cooperative
phenotypes would increase the gradient of the expected relation-
ship between social proximity and probability of reciprocation. In
fact, it has long been argued in one way or another that
assortment, such that cooperative individuals interact with one
another more frequently than with non-cooperators, increases the
relative fitness of cooperator genotypes (e.g. [48,72,73]. Unfortu-
nately, given the homogeneity of our network, we cannot really
explore the assortment hypothesis in this case.
A particularly interesting observation from our study is the
participants’ willingness to invest more effort on the behalf of some
of their peers (those with whom they share a very strong social tie)
than for themselves. This contrasts with Madsen et al’s study [33],
which used the same methodology and in which participants did
not invest more effort for any class of relative than they did for
themselves. One explanation for this discrepancy could be
increased importance of or potential for direct benefits stemming
from reciprocity or reputation in a social as opposed to family
setting. On the simplest level, one could imagine that individuals
might expect relatives to help them regardless of their own past
behaviour if the indirect (kin-selected) benefits of helping are
sufficiently high [24]; in the absence of significant indirect fitness
ties between non-kin more effort must be expended in helping in
order to ensure reciprocal conferment of help in the future. This is
an area that would benefit from explicit empirical and theoretical
exploration.
This particular network was well-connected and homogeneous,
characteristics that potentially explain the lack of influence of
variables other than tie strength, such as any ‘‘extra’’ benefits of
cooperation that could stem from the recipient’s social position.
Further, levels of declared friendship were fairly high in this
network. A more diffuse or subdivided network, with skewed
betweenness and/or degree distributions and perhaps lower levels
of friendship between its members, would provide a better test for
potential effects of trust, past experience, betweenness and
hierarchy. It would also allow us to explore the hypothesis that
cooperative individuals tend to cluster together. Such networks
could potentially be found in large companies, where individuals
do not work together so closely as is common in research units.
Local neighbourhoods in urban communities may be useful for
similar reasons.
We present in this work a methodology which is relatively novel
and which, we argue, contains aspects which have been under-
utilised in studies of cooperative behaviour. We would therefore
like to discuss three specific areas which would benefit from further
thought and development. Firstly, we picked one of several
potential ways to standardise squat time. As the originators of this
measure of investment effort [33] had standardised by time
squatted for oneself, we also used this method. However, it may be
argued that the small but significant effect of order on relative
squat time could render this approach problematic. One
alternative would be to first ask participants to squat until they
reach a self-reported pain threshold, and standardise all times by
this threshold. Any effect of order (due perhaps to acclimatisation
to the exercise) might then more neatly partial out of the model
and give a more reliable estimate of the effect sizes of the variables
under investigation. However, because it is not clear how to
numerically represent ‘self’ in our independent matrices, this
approach would be problematic if we specifically wanted to
investigate investment in others versus self.
Secondly, it should be noted that the network in our study was
not complete, in that not all members of the research unit took
Figure 3. Effects of out-link strength and in- minus out-link on
cooperative investment. Point size reflects standardised time
squatted: white points show actual data, grey point is for reference
only and corresponds to a standardised time of 1 Participants suffered a
higher cost for recipients to whom they had declared a strong social
link (p,0.001) and who had declared a a stronger social link to them
(in-link minus out-link, p= 0.001).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018338.g003
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part in the study. This may affect node-based measures such as
betweenness, may imply that we captured only a single component
of a multi-component network and/or mean that we are missing
individuals from the periphery of the social group [21]. However,
we did uncover a range of link strengths, from pairs of individuals
that were connected only by virtue of belonging to this group to
pairs of individuals who were very close friends, so while our
power may have been low it is unlikely that our results are
invalidated by incomplete sampling. We must also acknowledge
the incompleteness of our dependent matrix (time invested) – for
obvious considerations of time and participant fatigue, we had to
limit the number of recipients for whom each participant squatted.
While we have a statistically sound method for dealing with the
ensuing missing variables, the signal from these values may swamp
that from our explanatory variables and we may have underes-
timated the strength of the effect of social proximity.
Thirdly, we are well aware of the potential pitfalls [74] of the
stepwise regression approach taken in our analysis. However,
robust criteria for model comparison such as AIC or BIC are not
available to us when we use MRQAP – which is demanded by the
intrinsic non-independence of network data. MRQAP does
provide us with measures of R2, which can be used as a criterion
for comparing nested models, but the huge signal from the missing
values matrix discussed above inflated R2 to the point where it was
essentially the same for all models. If a network approach is to be
more widely used in behavioural ecology – and we strongly believe
that it has much to offer – more theoretical work on the statistical
analysis of network data, particularly from the perspective of
model choice, is essential.
In summary, we present our results as novel and preliminary
observations that support further and more complete exploration
of cooperation in real-world social groups. A study of a sample of
different social networks could usefully test whether the old adage
that one may choose one’s friends, but not one’s relatives, has a
bearing on social investment rules.
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